Author: Miķelis Jurģis Bērziņš
This essay was written as the concluding work for the course “The Problem of Evil” at my university. The authors mentioned in this essay largely reflect the ones contained in the course. While this essay is polemical in style and attempts to showcase contradictions in Catholic theology, I wish to emphasize that the given critique is only possible due to the power and greatness of Augustine’s and Aquinas’ argumentation, and I wish to thank them for their contribution in the search for truth. My argumentation is not conclusive and should be taken as an open question for solutions.
The primary problem of evil is often formulated as that of theodicy: how is it possible for an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God to allow the existence of evil? Best of the answers usually focus on the question of “what is evil?”, and, thus, try to explain its place and necessity in the world. And indeed, the classic arguments of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas are quite satisfactory, when it comes to the human world. Augustine specifically emphasizes that evil proceeds as a necessity of free will, which, on the other hand, is needed for creatures to truly embrace goodness.1 Therefore, evil is a necessary condition of goodness. Thomas Aquinas also speaks of “natural” evil that arise out of a clash of opposite natures. For example, an increase in strength of a fire’s nature would corrupt the nature of the wood upon which it acts by that much more
— the natural good of the fire would be the accidental evil of its burnt wood. This evil may be called natural, for it arises out of a things nature, yet it remains true that it causes evil to an incompatible nature by accident, because its true aim is the good of its own nature, which in and of itself is good. There is also evil that comes from weakness or is caused by an imperfection in the means of action, e. g. a weakness of reason may lead to an evil even though it sought a good or when a rope is used to lift something, but due to its poor quality rips and damages the carried goods.2 So all evil is caused by accident, but never for itself.
However, an issue remains — an issue that pertains to the field of theology rather than anthropology. So, while Kant and later authors are generally useless to us, Hannah Arendt, with her Christian convictions, at least throws us a lead: is this truly all that evil amounts to or is a diabolical, inhuman evil possible? The closest example of absolute evil in terms of Christianity is Lucifer, Satan, or the Devil, here used interchangeably for one and the same being. But even his choice of insubordination to God is explained by Aquinas as seeking a good. That is, Satan, through his free will, chose to put the good of his own nature above that of God’s, and due to this act of rebellion against the true order of things, he was guilty of the sin of pride.
“Alio modo contingit peccare per liberum arbitrium, eligendo aliquid quod secundum se est bonum, sed non cum ordine debitae mensurae aut regulae; ita quod defectus in- ducens peccatum sit solum ex parte electionis, quae non habet debitum ordinem, non ex parte rei electae; sicut si aliquis eligeret orare, non attendens ad ordinem ab Eccle- sia institutum. Et huiusmodi peccatum non praeexigit igno- rantiam, sed absentiam solum considerationis eorum quae considerari debent. Et hoc modo Angelus peccavit, conver- tendo se per liberum arbitrium ad proprium bonum, absque ordine ad regulam divinae voluntatis.”3
Now, what I believe to be the true problem of evil becomes much more apparent. How can an angel, not subject to passions, freely choose to prefer his own nature to that of God’s, while perfectly knowing that his attempt at usurpation is bound to end in sorrow an failure? Or even more precisely: how may an angel knowingly choose his own nature, while neglecting that which is its fulfilment? Because none shall deny, and especially not any angel, that any being’s completeness can only be found in its creator and not in itself, separated from its source of being.
Thus, there must be a mistake in some previous consideration. Ether Satan made his choice out of foolishness or in accordance with God’s plan. Since such stupidity seems unfit for an angel, and there is no real explanation as to from where this ignorance might arise, let’s take a look at the second option, i. e. that Satan not only most likely was, as is admitted by Aquinas himself,4 but still is God’s “top guy”. There is no explanation for the arising of foolishness, which has no foundation without a lack of knowing, due to the fact, that Satan made his choice, while in a state of perfection as God had created him. The choice in full knowledge preceded the sin and not the other way around. Therefore, the loss of certain faculties of knowledge that are granted by grace could only occur after the choice and not before it. Who thought you could stumble upon the Advaita Vedanta problem of ignorance in Christianity?
Considering the possibility of Satan acting in accordance with God’s will, it might not be surprising that Jews practiced, and perhaps still practice, praying to him, although it must be admitted that their conception diverges so far that this might be a futile comparison.5 The real argument for this conception de-
rives from the position, that “evil” is not only a necessary possibility, as is the case when speaking of free will, but also necessary in actuality. For the full- ness of creation can only exist, if all degrees of goodness are permitted to be: “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, perfectiō universī requirit inaequalitatem esse in rebus, ut omnes bonitatis gradus impleantur.”6 And since, as argued above, natural goods of certain natures are accidental evils of different natures, real particular evils must be allowed for the good of all.7 Therefore Sa- tan fulfills the most difficult and unpleasant task of God, while serving God’s will
— God gives his hardest tasks to his most loyal soldiers, so to speak. The only difficulty remains with the eschaton. For if the perfection of the world entails evil, how can a world separated from it be more perfect than the current one? Well it can’t, at least not if it’s thought of as destroying the current one, for then there would only exist a part of the whole, not the whole itself. It follow that the world does not end in time, but only outside of it, because otherwise only a partial and imperfect world has been created.
In conclusion, the real problem of evil pertains to the angels and eschatology rather than to theodicy. And, as it turns out, Satan might not be an opposing force to God — instead, a willing doer of God’s dirtiest job.
1 Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will.
2 Aquinas, T., “SUMMA THEOLOGIAE”, Pars I Quaestio 49.
3 Aquinas, T., “SUMMA THEOLOGIAE”, Pars I, Quaestio 63, Articulus 1.
4 Aquinas, T., “SUMMA THEOLOGIAE”, Pars I, Quaestio 63, Articulus 8.
5 Shahak, I., Jewish History, Jewish Religion, pp. 40–41.
6 Aquinas, T., “SUMMA THEOLOGIAE”, Pars I, Quaestio 48, Articulus 2.
7 Aquinas, T., “SUMMA THEOLOGIAE”, Pars I, Quaestio 22, Articulus 2.
Bibliography
1. Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, trans. Th. Williams [Ebook] (Indi- anapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1993).
2. Aquinas, T., “SUMMA THEOLOGIAE” in OPERA OMNIA, tomī 4–12 (Ro-mae: Typographia Polyglotta, 1888–1906).
3. Shahak, I., Jewish History, Jewish Religion (London: Pluto Press, 2008).